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Fisheries co-management starts with the premise that stakeholders have the 
innate capacity to improve resource conditions as well as the welfare of the society. 
Recent investigations have shown that the co-management approach for governing 
natural resources can result in higher levels of productivity, and lower administration 
and enforcement costs than the national and centralized management approach. This 
suggests a need for rapid and substantial evaluation of fisheries management 
institutions. The main purpose of this study was to examine the economic 
performance of the fisheries co-management institution in the Oxbow Lake fisheries 
of Bangladesh. Firstly, this study examined net welfare change to society as a result 
of the introduction of a co-management system. Secondly. the resource rent and 
transaction costs analyses were used to evaluate the efficiency of the co-managed 
institution compared to the centralized management institution. 
The simultaneous equation model consisting of supply, demand and identity 
equations were estimated and Marshallian surplus measurement was used to estimate 
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the welfare change with and without the co-management system. A cross� sectional 
heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive model proposed by Kmenta (1986) was 
utilized for the estimation. The analysis showed that the co-management program 
had caused a welfare gain to society amounting to 1805186 Tk (USD 38989) from 
the original situation. Both consumers and producers gained by the project 
intervention, however, consumer welfare gain was bigger valued at 1762399 Tk 
(Usn 38065) than that of producers valued at 42787 Tk (Usn 924). 
The Oxbow Lake co-management system had also resulted in higher rent of 
19802 Tk/ha (Usn 427 per ha), compared to the rent in government managed Lakes 
of 5652 TkIha (Usn 122 per ha). The results also showed that return to capital and 
labor was also high in most of the co-managed Lakes compared to the government� 
managed Lakes. 
Static and dynamic processes were utilized in this study to measure the 
transaction costs of fisheries management. The results presented in this thesis 
showed that transaction costs of managing the fisheries were lower under a c0-
management arrangement i.e. 2938 Tk/ha (Usn 63 per ha) than the centralized 
management system of 4707 TkIba (Usn 102 per ha). 
The results from the analysis showed a better performance for the co­
managed Lakes compared to the government-managed Lakes. The findings revealed 
that the lower transaction costs and higher resource rents are the result of the 
increased legitimacy inherent in the co-management system. This increased 
legitimacy encouraged fishers to develop cooperative approaches for effective 
management of the Oxbow Lakes. 
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memenuhi kepeduan untuk Ijazah Doktor Falsafah 
IMPAK-IMPAK KEBAJIKAN DAN KOS-KOS URUSNIAGA BAGI 
PERNGURUSAN PERIKANAN SECARA BERSAMA DI TASIK OXBOW DI 
BANGLADESH. 
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KHONDKER MURSBED - E- JABAN 
September 2000 
Pengerusi : Profesor Dr. Nik Mustapba Raja Abdullah 
Fakulti : Ekonomi dan Pengurusan 
Pengurusan perikanan secam bersama berasas kepada andaian bahawa 
pernegang amanah harta (stakeholders) rnernpunyai keupayaan sernulajadi untuk 
memperbaiki keadaan sumber dan juga kebajikan masyarakat. Kajian terbaru telah 
menunjukkan bahawa sistem pengurusan secara bersama mampu rnenjirnatkan dari 
segi produktiviti, pentadbiran dan pelaksanaan berbanding dengan sistem pengurusan 
negara dan ber pusat. Oleh itu wujud kepeduan pembentukan institusi pengurusan 
perikanan secara bersama dengan segera dan teguh bersama dengan proses-proses 
lain yang rnungkin. Tujuan utama kajian ini ialah untuk rnengkaji prestasi ekonomi 
institusi pengurusan perikanan secara bersama di kawasan perikanan Tasik Oxbow, 
Bangladesh. Pertama, kajian ini menilai kesan perubahan kebajikan bersih ke atas 
masyarakat basil dari pengenalan sistem pengurusan bersama K.edua, analisis sewa 
surnber dan kos urusniaga digunakan untuk menilai kecekapan institusi yang 
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diuruskan secam bersama berbandig dengan institusi perancangan pusat Model 
persamaan serentak yang mengandungi persamaan penawaran, pennintaan dan 
identiti di anggarkan dan ukuran lebiban Marshallian digunakan untuk menilai 
perubaban kebajikan dengan dan tanpa sistem pengurusan secara bersama. 
Model keratan-lintang heteroskedastik dan autoregresif berunsurkan-masa 
(Time-wise) yang dicadangkan oleh Kmenta (1986) digunakan bagi tujuan anggaran. 
Analisis menunjukkan bahawa projek pengurusan secara bersama telah menyumbang 
laba kebajikan kepada masyarakat berjumlab 1803709 Tk (Usn 38957). Kedua-dua 
pengguna dan pengeluar menikmati laba basil campurtangan projek, 
walaubagaimanapun, laba kebajikan pengguna adalab lebih besar iaitu 1752357 Tk 
(Usn 37848) berbanding yang diperolehi oleh pengeluar sebanyak 51352 Tk: (Usn 
1109). 
Sistem pengurusan secara bersama Tasik Oxbow juga menghasilkan sewa 
ekonomi yang lebih tinggi iaitu 19802 Tk/ha (Usn 427 per ha), berbanding dengan 
tasik yang diuruskan oleh kerajaan iaitu 5652 TkIha (USD 122 per ha). Basil kajian 
juga menunjukkan bahawa pulangan modal dan buruh adalah tinggi di kebanyakkan 
tasik yang diuruskan secara bersama berbanding dengan tasik yang diuruskan oleh 
kerajaan. 
Proses statik dan dinamik digunakan di dalam kajian ini untuk menilai kos 
urusniaga pengurusan perikanan. HasH yang dikernukakan dalam kajian ini 
menunjukkan bahawa kos urusniaga bagi mengwuskan perikanan adalah lebih murah 
di bawah sistem pengurusan secara bersama i.e. 2938 Tk/ha (USn 63 per ha) 
berbanding sistern pengurusan pusat pada 4707 TkIha (Usn 102 per ha). 
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Penemuan yang wujud dari analisis menunjukkan prestasi yang lebih baik 
bagi sistem pengurusan secara bersama berbanding dengan sistem yang diuruskan 
oleh kerajaan. Hasil kajian mendedahkan bahawa kos urusniaga yang rendah dan 
sewa sumber yang tinggi adalah basil dari peningkatan ligitimasi yang tersirat di 
dalam sistem pengurusan secara bersama. Peningkatan legitimasi ini mendorong 
nelayan-nelayan untuk membentuk sikap seragam yang diperlukan bagi pengurusan 
tasik Oxbow yang berkesan. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Bangladesh is blessed with vast inland waters and abundant fisheries 
resources. Fish is a valuable natural resource in Bangladesh, which contributes 
significantly to the national economy. Fishery plays a major role in nutrition, 
employment and foreign exchange earnings. Fisheries account for about 3.27 percent 
of the country's GDP and contributes 60 percent of the nation's animal protein 
intake. Furthennore, it provides full time employment to about 1.2 million people 
and, also, part time employment to some 11 million people. About 10 percent of total 
export earnings come from this sector (FFYP, 1997). Fisheries sector in Bangladesh 
is believed to have tremendous potential for growth. According to World Bank 
(1991) fish production could grow at a rate as high as 4.5 percent per year in the next 
two decades through improvement in management and technology. 
Fishery resources of Bangladesh operates under complex biological, 
technological, climatic, social. economic. political and institutional conditions 
(Ahsanullah, 1989). Until 1986 the basic mechanism for managing fishery resources 
in inland water bodies of Bangladesh had been based on the allocation of fishery 
rights through periodic leasing (one to three years). Usually, the lessee was a 
middleman who owned the exclusive rights to harvest fish in a water body. upon 
payment of a leasing fee to the government. The process was replicated through sub­
leasing. These middle� hired fishers to catch fish. Fishers in need of fishing 
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grounds were required to pay these sub-leasing chain members (middlemen) to 
obtain their access. This system however had failed to serve the national interest of 
conserving the fisheries and protecting the economic fortune of the fishers (Aguero, 
1989). The middlemen and wealthy private financiers are driven by self-interest to 
exploit the fishers at the cost of resource sustainability as well as the misery of the 
fishing community. As a consequence resource productivity have been reduced and 
the economic conditions of the fishers have deteriorated (AhsanuIlah, 1989). 
The realization of the above problem led the Bangladesh government to 
pursue a New Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP) in 1986 that opened up 
fisheries only to those who are directly engaged in fishing. The strategy of the NFMP 
was to gradually abolish the system of leasing water bodies to middlemen and to 
replace it with the licensing system in order to establish the access rights of genuine 
fishers (explained in section 1.2). Furthennore, it was expected that this system 
would help to develop a direct relation between the government and fishers with the 
aim to establish ultimately a partnership arrangement for resource management. 
For the proper implementation of NFMP. two types of management options 
are being examined, namely the current centralized management system and a 
proposed co-management system. The economic performance of each of these 
management systems is yet to be addressed In this study the societal welfare impacts 
in terms of resource rent generation and transaction costs of co-management system 
are evaluated and are compared with the centralized management system. This 
evaluation was carried out for Oxbow Lake Fisheries in the western part of 
Bangladesh. 
1.3 
1.1 Fishing Community in Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh fisherfolk are classified into two groups, genuine fishers also 
known as a professional fishers or full time fishers and non-fishers or middlemen. 
The Department of fisheries, in its New Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP) 
defmes a genuine fisher as one who devotes at least 9 months per year in fishing or 
gets 90 percent of his income from fishing. The Poverty oriented Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) defines a genuine fisher as anybody who is 
directly engaged in fishing. In this study, for government managed Oxbow Lakes a 
genuine fisher is identified by the definition provided by NFMP. In co-management 
Lakes, the term genuine fishers is used for those who are directly engaged in fishing 
and owns up to 0.5 acre of land, or who earns an equivalent of or less than the 
income that can be derived from 0.5 acre of land (IF AD, DANIDA and UNOPS, 
1994). 
The fishing community in Bangladesh is made up mainly of Hindu fishers. 
However, with demograpbic changes and stagnation in agriculture, Muslims started 
to take up this trade (Taufique, 1995). Traditionally. Hindu fishers live in cluster 
homesteads in villages situated close to a water body. The official figure shows that 
the number of inland fishers in Bangladesh has increased from 650000 in 1972-73 to 
768000 in 1988-89 (BBS, 1997). 
In Bangladesh, genuine fishers constitute an underclass that is associated 
with landlessness and powerlessness, a prey to political bosses and exploitative credit 
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contracts by middlemen. Due to financial shortage and lack of credit facility. fishers 
are dependent on these middlemen who take a bigger share of their catch. These 
middlemen belong to rural power elites who, through their monopolistic control, 
exploit the fishers. TIle revenue oriented fishing policy, whereby fishers have little 
participation in decision making could hardly enjoy the benefits of common 
property. However, the difficult task of harvesting the fish is left to them. 
1.2 Fisheries Resource System and Sector-Wise Contribution 
Bangladesh, is the delta of major river systems originating from the 
Himalayas. Bangladesh, therefore is uniquely rich in water bodies. Apart from the 
near-shore Exclusive Economic Zone (E£Z) and the vast seas beyond, to which she 
has free access, Bangladesh possesses a wide range of water bodies, namely marshes, 
reservoirs, Lakes, natural depressions. rivers and estuaries that allow an extensive 
inland fishery. Covering an estimated total inland water area of 4.3 million hectare 
(Table 1.1) with nearly 277 fish species, this inland fishery provides significant 
livelihood opportunities for the people of Bangladesh (BBS, 1997). 
Fish in Bangladesh comes mainly from two sources, inland and marine. The 
marine fisheries sector is categorized into industrial (trawl) and artisanal types, while 
the inland fisheries is classified into two broad categories, capture (also called open) 
and culture (also called closed) fishery. The tenn capture fishery is used to refer to 
the harvesting of fish and prawn populations that are self-reproducing and self­
sustaining in inland open water systems. On the other hand, the growing of fish in 
l.5 
confined bodies of water like ponds and Oxbow Lakes through aquaculture 
operations is called culture fishery. The different components of capture fisheries are 
river (including estuaries), canals, flood plains, beels (natural depressions), and 
Kaptai Lake (it was formed by the creation of a dam across the river Karnaphuli in 
the southeastern district of Chittagong). On the other hand close water habitats are 
coastal bm.ckish water ponds and Oxbow Lakes. Of the total areas of inland water 
bodies, culture fisheries cover 6.7 percent while the rest is covered by capture fishery 
(Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: Inland Fisheries Areas in Bangladesh, 1997 
Fishery Types 
Rivers & Estuaries 
BeeJs 
KaptaiLakes 
Flood Lands 
Total Capture Fisheries 
Oxbow Lakes (Baors) 
Ponds 
Coastal Aquaculture 
Total Culture Fisheries 
Inland Total 
Area ( hectare) 
1031563 
114161 
68800 
2832792 
40473316 
(93.3%)* 
5488 
146890 
137996 
290374 
(6.7'l1o)* 
4337690 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of statistics (BBS), 1997. 
Note: • Figure in the Pan::ntbesiI indicate Percentage shan: of totallDW:Jd. Water 
Although only 6.7 percent of the area is covered by culture fishery, its 
contribution to total fish production is significantly higher than capture fishery which 
covers almost 94 percent of the total inland water areas (Table 1.2). In 1996-97 about 
30 percent of the total fish production came from culture fishery? 48 percent from 
capture fishery and the rest from marine. The share of fish from culture fishery 
increased from 23.5 percent in 1990-91 to 30 percent in 1996-97. During this period 
the share of capture and marine fishery decreased from 49.5 percent to 48.03 percent 
